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The EU and Brazil: Trading Partners in Different Fora
♣ 
 
Dr. Rafael Leal-Arcas
 ♦ 
I. Introduction 
 
This paper aims at understanding the potential of partnership of the European Union (EU) with 
Brazil, focusing on international trade law and policy. Although the power base of Brazil is its 
respective region, there may be specific policy areas in which its influence might be global.
1 With 
this in mind, the paper raises interesting questions: is the EU an attractive partner for Brazil? 
Does the EU want cooperation with Brazil? What are the characteristics of Brazil? What are the 
EU’s priorities in its foreign trade policy? With which instruments can the EU engage Brazil and 
how can the EU internal coordination be ensured? 
  The paper argues that the EU’s objective of engaging with Brazil is to establish peace, 
security, and prosperity in the XXI century. Trade creates economic ties and generates more 
welfare; thus it contributes to peace and security (e.g. the EU integration). The same argument is 
true multilaterally: before the creation of Doha Round in 2001, developing and least-developed 
countries had been marginalized in the world trading system,
2 which brought with it serious 
economic implications. In 2001 in Doha (Qatar), developing countries were promised inclusion in 
the world trading system in order to achieve a higher level of justice and equity in the world. That 
is why the Doha round is called the development agenda.
3 The argument is that a more open and 
                                                           
     
♣ Paper presented at Dalhouse University Conference on The EU as a Global Actor, May 5-6, 2008, under the co-
sponsorship of the European Commission. 
     
♦ Rafael Leal-Arcas is a Lecturer in international economic law and the external relations law of the 
European Union at Queen Mary, University of London, where he acts as Deputy Director of Graduate 
Studies. He is the author of more than 30 publications, the most recent of which is his book Theory and 
Practice of EC External Trade Law and Policy (Cameron May, London, 2008). Dr. Leal-Arcas has been a 
consultant to the World Trade Organization, has served in the U.S. Curt of International Trade, and in 
various EU institutions. He has been a Tillar House Resident Fellow at the American Society of 
International Law, a Fellow at Georgetown Law Center, a Visiting Researcher at Harvard Law School, an 
Emile Noël Fellow at NYU School of Law, Fellow at the Australian National University, and Visiting 
Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. He has completed his graduate legal 
education at Stanford, Columbia, the London School of Economics, and the European University Institute 
(Florence, Italy). 
    
1 In 2007, the International Monetary Fund ranked Brazil as the tenth wealthiest nation in the world in absolute    
terms. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) (last visited May 18, 2008). 
    
2 Ismail, F. “How Can Least-Developed Countries and Other Small, Weak and Vulnerable Economies Also Gain 
from the Doha Development Agenda on the Road to Hong Kong?” Journal of World Trade, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 37-68, 
2006. 
    
3 Not everyone agrees with the governmental position that the Doha Round is beneficial to developing and least-
developed countries. For severe criticisms of the Doha Round, see Oxfam Press Release, “New WTO framework 
doesn’t add up to development,” 22 June 2006, available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060622_wto (last visited May 18, 2008); Hertel, T.W. & Keeney, 
R. “What is at Stake: The Relative Importance of Import Barriers, Export Subsidies, and Domestic Support,” available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/Ch2AgTradeBook_HertelKeeney.pdf; Bouet, 
A., Orden, D. & Mevel, S. “More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round? Winners and Losers from Trade Lberalization 
with a Development Perspective,” available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2508.doc (last 
visited May 18, 2008); Kinnman, S. & Lodefalk, M. “Economic Implications of the Doha Round,” Swedish National 
Board of Trade, July 2006, available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2756.pdf; European 
Commission Press Release, “Doha Round: Some Recent Economic Analysis,” MEMO/06/247, available at   5   
equitable trading system
4 brings peace to the world and, in this sense, the Doha round should not 
be approached as a zero-sum game –as many developing countries seem to perceive it- but as a 
win-win situation.
5 
  The paper also argues that there remains substantial scope for Brazil to make further 
commitments towards greater liberalization within the services sectors and within all modes of 
supply provided in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It will be demonstrated 
that, despite the commitments made within the GATS, services sectors still exhibit limitations 
that restrict equal competition for foreign competitors, sometimes resulting in non-compliance 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) doctrines of market access and national treatment. 
Different  WTO  countries  set  different  strategies  for  services  liberalisation,  reflected  in  their 
GATS or other negotiating positions. Excessive use of non-tariff barriers
6 can lead to ineffective 
enforcement of GATS commitments, resulting in true market access lagging behind bound rates. 
Some countries keep a conservative position on their bound commitments, while in reality a more 
liberal access is enjoyed, affording them stronger leverage on future rounds of negotiation. A 
failure to effectively enforce bound commitments can also reflect an inability within a country to 
ensure uniform domestic implementation.
7 
It will also be argued that the attitude of Brazil to multilateralism and responsibility in 
global governance is questionable or unclear. Brazil wants to become a more important player, it 
seems  to  lean  against  “old”  powers  (mainly  the  U.S.),  and  tends  to  focus  on  South-South 
regionalism. Evidence of this is the trilateral developmental initiative IBSA (India, Brazil, South 
Africa).
8 
  The EU has a long history of promoting regional integration in other parts of the world, 
especially among developing countries. This is based on its own nature as the oldest and most 
advanced regional scheme, coupled with the perception among leading European policymakers 
that the EU does indeed constitute a model for others.
9 The EU has therefore long viewed itself as 
a “‘natural’ supporter of regional initiatives,”
10 a view that sparked the increasing externalization 
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/247&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en (last visited May 18, 2008). 
    
4 Mr Mandelson, who referred to a development package for least-developed countries (LDCs) as ‘indispensable,’ 
indicated at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference that the EU had committed to step up annual spending on aid 
for trade to EUR 2 billion by 2010. One billion of this will come from EU Member States, which agreed at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Conference to the increase (from EUR 400 million per year); the remainder will come from the 
European Commission. "Europe did not come to Hong Kong empty-handed on aid for trade," he said. See in this 
respect, Iorio, M. “The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and Aid for Trade: Finding the Policy Link,” International 
Gender and Trade Network, 2007. 
    
5 For an analysis of the evolution of the world trading system, see Demaret, P. “The Metamorphoses of the GATT: 
From the Havana Charter to the World Trade Organization,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1995) Vol. 34, 
123-171. 
    
6 Non-tariff barriers or non-tariff measures are measures other than tariffs applied by governments at the border that 
determine the extent to which a good or service has access to the import market.  
    
7 Among those who claim that there is potential for developing countries to benefit from trade liberalization are: 
Anderson, K., Maritin, W. & van der Mensbrugghe, D. “Doha Merchandise Trade Reform: What’s at Stake for 
Developing Countries?,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3848, February 2006, available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/02/15/000016406_20060215164859/Rendered/
PDF/wps3848.pdf. 
    
8 The IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) represents three important poles for galvanizing South-
South cooperation and greater understanding between three important continents of the developing world namely, 
Africa, Asia and South America. The forum provides the three countries with a platform to engage in discussions for 
cooperation in the field of agriculture, trade, culture, and defense among others. See Wikipedia, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India-Brazil-South_Africa_Dialogue_Forum (last visited April 1, 2008).  
    
9 David Miliband, “Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower,” Speech Given at the College of Europe, Bruges, 
15  November  2007;  Romano  Prodi,  “Europe  and  Global  Governance,”  Speech  to  the  2nd  COMECE  Congress, 
Brussels, 31 March 2000: No. 00/115. 
    
10  European  Commission,  “Support  for  Regional  Economic  Integration  Efforts  among  Developing  Countries,” 
COM(95), 219 final (Brussels, 16 June 1995, p. 6).   6   
of its model over time. This policy has become one of the cornerstones of the EU’s development 
policy, and the incentive of offering market access to the EU’s large internal market in support of 
such  a  strategy  has  gained  in  salience  in  recent  years.  By  promoting  regional  integration, 
therefore, the EU actively influences emergent forms of regional governance in other parts of the 
world. 
  The EU’s main motivation for the promotion of regional integration is predicated on 
trade and economic gains. According to this view, the EU needs to have important economic 
interests at stake in order to get involved in the integrative efforts of other countries. These 
interests are two-fold: first, the EU promotes the integration of national markets into regional 
economies  to  benefit  from  economies  of  scale  when  accessing  them  with  their  own  goods. 
Second, through the negotiation of bi-regional trade agreements, the Union has a powerful tool to 
shape the framework of economic governance in counterpart regions.
11 
  The Union has a lot to gain from the integration of small, fragmented markets into larger 
economic units in which EU products can circulate more easily. Market size has become an 
important criterion for investment and trade decisions by private companies and serves as a strong 
incentive for European traders and investors: “the whole will grow faster than the sum of its parts, 
offering  outlets  for  our  exports  and  opportunities  for  our  investors.”
12  This  rationale  is  best 
reflected in the EU’s new approach to integration in Africa through the negotiation of economic 
partnership  agreements  (EPAs)
13:  they  “should  deal  with  all  factors  that  constrain  business 
activities in ACP countries”
14 through “the creation of open, integrated regions sufficiently large 
to trigger economies of scale, support trade and attract foreign investment.”
15 Such a strategy has 
been evaluated by one commentator as indicating that it “is based upon securing market access 
for  European  producers  while  selling  the  concept  of  the  European  ‘model’  of  regional 
integration.”
16 As the creation of regional markets goes hand in hand with the development of a 
regional economic governance framework, the Union has an interest in being able to access the 
enlarged market on terms that are favorable to its own industry. Regional economic integration is 
an ongoing process that is never complete. The EU has a comparative advantage to other such 
schemes as the integration process is the most advanced, and it can therefore draw on its long 
experience in formulating common rules to impact the economic integration process of others.
17 
The  paper  is  divided  into  three  parts:  I  present  first  the  EU’s  unilateral  approach  to 
international trade law in relation to Brazil, followed by a multilateral approach when dealing 
with Brazil in trade issues. A bilateral/regional approach with Brazil follows, with an examination 
of the EU-Brazil trade relations before the conclusion. 
 
 
 
                                                           
    
11 Meunier, S. and Nicolaidis, K. “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power” Journal of European Public 
Policy, September 2006, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 906-925. 
    
12 Lamy, P. “Regionalism and Multilateralism in Latin America” speech delivered at the Federação das Indústrias do 
Estado de São Paulo, 10 July 2001. 
    
13 Economic partnership agreements are bilateral or plurilateral agreements. The content of such agreements varies 
greatly. Some merely promote voluntary economic cooperation between the partners. Others are proper free-trade  
agreements. See Walter Goode, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, 5th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 145. 
    
14 European Commission, “EPA Negotiations: Toolbox” (Brussels, 27 January 2003). 
    
15 European Commission, “Africa, Caribbean, Pacific. EPA Negotiations: Toolbox,” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/toolbox_en.htm#top (last visited April 25, 2008). 
    
16 Farrell, M. “The EU and Inter-Regional Cooperation: In Search of Global Presence?,” in A. Verdun and E. Jones, 
The Political Economy of European Integration, (Routledge, January 2005), p. 19. 
    
17 Anne-Sophie Claeys and Alice Sindzingre, “Regional Integration as a Transfer of Rules: The Case of the 
Relationship between the European Union and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU),” paper 
given at Development Studies Association Annual Conference, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, 10-12 September 
2003. Available at http://www.edpsg.org/Documents/dp26.doc (last visited April 25, 2008).   7   
II. Unilateralism 
 
The focus in this section is to determine whether the EU can increase cooperation and establish 
trust through unilateral liberalization. In purely economic terms, unilateral most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) liberalization is in the interest of each country. However, trade liberalization in political 
economy terms is seen as a concession and is resisted by import substitution
18 industries. This 
means that unilateral MFN-liberalization on a broad scale is often not very viable for the EU. 
When looking at bilateral political relations, we note that unilateral liberalization could 
work as a “carrot” to the benefit of the respective country. Given that only one country benefits, 
this is politically more feasible. Unilateral liberalization could also work as a “stick” because 
withdrawal is possible at any time. 
The  EU  already  uses  unilateral  preferences.  For  example,  the  everything-but-arms 
initiative,
19  or  the  preferential  treatment  given  to  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP) 
countries, although neither one of these programs is applicable to Brazil. The original Treaty of 
Rome
20 contained guidelines about external relations. First of all, the treaty established a special 
regime for development aid and cooperation, which initially aided developing countries that had a 
long-standing relationship (mostly former colonies) with founding Member States.
21 This regime 
was further developed through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, which linked 70 developing 
countries to the European Community (EC). 
Another unilateral tool used by the EU is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
22 
This  is  a  multilaterally  agreed  instrument,  where  Brazil  is  a  beneficiary.  However,  tariff 
reductions are generally not very meaningful because of preference margins not being very large, 
because of sensitive goods, graduation for product groups where competitiveness has increased, 
or restrictive rules of origin. It is interesting to note that, although the Union does use the GSP 
Plus incentive system
23 to foster sustainable development and good governance, Brazil does not 
want to be part of it. So would it make sense to create a new unilateral instrument? Not really, 
since the political resistance for competition from Brazil would probably be strong, particularly 
with regard to agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
    
18 Import substitution is a policy for the development of a domestic productive capacity in goods and services to 
reduce or displace imports, often with the expectation of increases in employment and reductions in the current account 
deficit. For further information, see Walter Goode, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, 5th ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, p. 222. 
    
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001. This regulation grants duty-free access to imports of 
all products from least developed countries without any quantitative restrictions, except to arms and munitions. 
    
20 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC). 
    
21 B Martenczuk ‘Cooperation with Developing and Other Third Countries: Elements of a Community Foreign 
Policy’ in S Griller and B Weidel (eds) External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union 
(Springer, 2002) 385–417. 
    
22 The idea of granting developing countries preferential tariff rates in the markets of industrialized countries was 
originally presented by Raul Prebisch, the first Secretary-General of UNCTAD, at the first UNCTAD conference in 
1964. The Generalized System of Preferences was adopted at UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968. 
    
23 To benefit from the from the GSP Plus scheme, countries need to demonstrate that their economies are poorly 
diversified, and therefore dependent and vulnerable. They also need to have ratified and effectively implemented the 16 
core conventions on human and labour rights and 7 (out of 11) of the conventions related to good governance and the 
protection of the environment. At the same time beneficiary countries must commit themselves to ratifying and 
effectively implementing the international conventions which they have not yet ratified. In any case, the 27 conventions 
have to be ratified by the beneficiary countries by 31 December 2008. For the list of conventions to qualify for the GSP 
Plus scheme, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/memo230605_en.htm (last visited May 24, 2008).   8   
 
III. Multilateralism 
 
The question to ask is how to foster more constructive multilateralism by using a trade policy 
approach. The Doha Round
24 was the result of widespread agreement among delegates at the 4th 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha that it was time to address the imbalances of previous 
rounds and to offer developing countries the prospect of trade talks which they could see were to 
their benefit.
25 Although wealth redistribution seems to be vital to truly help the poor nations of 
the world, I would agree with WTO Director-General Lamy that the WTO’s role is not about 
redistribution of wealth. So a new Round was necessary to include poor countries in the world 
trading system, and to promote economic development, as well as to alleviate poverty.
26 
The WTO members are currently negotiating the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).
27 A 
successful  result  of  the  DDA  will  mean  more  growth  and  development  in  the  world  trading 
system. A sensu contrario, failure of the DDA will imply no growth or development for the 
world, especially the poorest countries on the planet. In addition, the failure of the DDA will be 
regarded as a missed historic opportunity to eliminate export subsidies, to put an end to trade 
distortion.  Consequently,  all  countries  of  the  world  trading  system  will  lose,  especially 
developing countries. With a successful result, the biggest gains to development will certainly be 
in  the  core  areas  of  goods,  services  and  agriculture,  and  hence  liberalising  trade  among 
developing countries is an essential part of the Doha exercise.
28 That is why the international 
community cannot miss the opportunity offered by the DDA, which can set a vision for the global 
economy for the next decades and make a major contribution to development. 
In this context, what role does Brazil play multilaterally? How can the EU engage with 
Brazil to foster the DDA? Brazil plays an increasingly important role at the WTO. Brazil has 
attained  a  global  reach  in  trade  policy  since  the  Cancún  WTO  Ministerial  Conference  in 
September 2003. Because major divides exist among the various WTO members in relation to 
what the WTO’s future agenda should comprise, the Doha Ministerial conference text put off all 
the major decisions until the following WTO Ministerial conference in Cancún, whose principal 
aim was to present an overview of the progress of the negotiations in the framework of the DDA. 
In Cancún, talks were intended to forge agreement on the Doha round’s objectives but collapsed 
due to strong North-South divide on agricultural issues. Developing nations gained in strength, 
                                                           
    
24 For a summary of the current Doha round of trade negotiations, see Leal-Arcas, R. Theory and Practice of EC 
External Trade Law and Policy, Cameron May, 2008, pp. 486-500. 
    
25 For an overview of the Doha Round, see S Cho ‘Doha’s Development’ (2006) 24 Berkeley Journal of International 
Law. 
    
26 This is certainly the position of European trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, who said at a Party of European 
Socialists conference in Brussels on Decent Work that far from being responsible for poor labour conditions, free trade 
could be a ladder out of poverty and ‘an engine of the very prosperity that helps societies put poor labour conditions 
behind them for good’. ‘Free trade is not the enemy of decent work’, he concluded: ‘The enemy of decent work is our 
willingness to turn a blind eye to it. Free trade does not mean trade indifferent to fair conditions of production’. See the 
speaking points on ‘Free Trade is not the Enemy of Decent Work’, given by commissioner Mandelson at a Party of 
European Socialists conference in Brussels on 10 May 2006 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/temp_icentre.cfm?temp=sppm098_en 
(last visited 13 May 2008). 
    
27 Interestingly, rich countries call this agenda of negotiations the “Doha Development Agenda,” whereas poor 
countries refer to it as the “Everything but Development Round.” It has certainly been a mistake to call this round the 
“development round,” since the DDA is a multilateral trade negotiation with very little input on development. This 
rather vague distinction between rich and poor countries is based on the World Bank’s country classification. See The 
World Bank, “Country Classification,” available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156
~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited March 20, 2008). 
    
28 As we saw in the pre-Hong Kong Ministerial Conference period of negotiations, the agriculture negotiations are 
considered key to the success of the overall Doha Round of WTO talks.   9   
forming  two  new  negotiating  groups  –  the  G-20,
29  consisting  of  middle-income  developing 
countries, and the G-90
30 group of poorer developing countries – and finally rejecting the deal 
which  they  viewed  as  unfavourable.  Evidence  of  the  fact  that  Brazil  is  increasingly  playing 
important roles multilaterally is in the G-20, where Brazil and India seem to act as leaders. In the 
G-4, Brazil and India are now members (with the U.S. and the EC), and have replaced Japan and 
Canada in this small circle. 
  So what is required from the EU to conclude the DDA? Agricultural liberalisation seems 
to be the key issue. Efforts to reach a preliminary agreement on the crucial Doha trade round have 
been stalled on the issue of agricultural subsidies and tariffs. The big trading blocs in the WTO 
(the US, Brazil, and Australia on one side, and the EC on the other) had been engaged in a tit-for-
tat struggle,
31 each refusing to accept that offers of subsidy cuts from the other had gone far 
enough. The group of 20 developing nations (G-20) is demanding heavier cuts from both sides. It 
is interesting to see the differences of opinion between the G-20’s strong stance on eliminating 
agricultural subsidies and the EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson’s statement that while 
there was a need for an ambitious Doha Round outcome, focusing on agriculture alone would be 
counter-productive. In response to a U.S. offer to cut farming subsidies by 60 per cent, the EC 
had offered to reduce its tariffs on agricultural goods by, on average, 38 per cent – an insufficient 
figure in the eyes of the U.S. and the developing countries. The EC, however, was driven by 
internal conflict, with France accusing commissioner Mandelson of exceeding his mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of the EU.
32 
  Turning now to Brazil, what is required from Brazil to conclude the Doha round? An 
immediate reaction would be that Brazil should be prepared to accept more responsibility for the 
multilateral system, i.e., hiding less behind the status of a developing country and stand up to 
their own ambition to new leadership. However, the term ‘development’ is not clearly defined in 
the Doha round. If the Doha round is concluded, certainly Brazil will greatly benefit from a better 
access to developed countries’ markets. However, this may happen partly at the expense of other 
poorer developing countries. Brazil should also accept greater differentiation among developing 
countries in the WTO and lower market barriers vis-à-vis poorer developing countries. 
What can the EU do to support all this? In my opinion, the EU should try to foster a new 
sense of trust with Brazil. However, the problem seems to be a direct conflict of interests as well 
as pressure on the Commission’s Directorate-General for external trade not to be too altruistic. 
The EU should also refrain from patronizing as a major economic “old” power. Moreover, the EU 
should accept and foster even more actively the new leadership roles of Brazil. Since lack of trust 
seems to be an important impediment toward progress in the Doha round, bilateral dialogues as 
well as more intensive and broader political cooperation between the EU and Brazil may establish 
new trust. In this sense, it is worth noting that during the Doha round a Strategic Partnership 
between the EU and Brazil has taken place.
33 
 
                                                           
    
29 The Group of 20, or G-20, is a group of developing countries focused on tearing down industrialised countries’ 
barriers to agricultural trade. In March 2006, the group included 21 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
    
30 The G-90 is a tripartite alliance of the African Union (AU), the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) and 
least-developed countries (LDCs), forming a majority of developing countries in the WTO. 
    
31 Tit-for-tat is the modus operandi in international trade. For example, country A raises barriers on product X 
because country B did it to product Y. 
    
32 It is interesting to observe the French fixation on agriculture, given the small percentage that it represents on 
France’s GDP. The argument of a French political obligation to look after France’s farmers seems evident, but is it 
macroeconomically justified? 
    
33 See European Commission, “Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” COM(2007) 281, 30 May 2007; see 
also European Commission press releases, EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/725&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en (last visited May 20, 2008).  10   
IV. Bilateralism/Regionalism 
 
The question to ask is: what can the EU offer Brazil to foster trust, a sense of cooperation and 
respect, as well as a better multipolar global governance framework? EC trade policy uses a 
pyramidal  structure  with  regard  to  the  various  degrees  of  trade  preferences  that  it  offers  to 
different countries and regions. Brazil has by and large been at the bottom of the preference 
pyramid thus far. An unofficial ranking of the preference pyramid would look as follows starting 
from the top: new EU Member States and accession candidates, countries with which the EC has 
a free-trade agreement, countries of the Mediterranean region, the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in relation to the Generalized 
System of Preferences.
34 So there appears to be a potential to offer more market-access to Brazil 
and embed this in a policy-centered foreign policy approach. 
If we look at bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) as instruments for liberalizing trade, 
the “carrot” function is important since FTAs offer preferential market-access, whereas in the 
“stick” function it does not seem to be realistic to withdraw preferences, as the given free-trade 
agreement would need to be breached. This situation seems hardly imaginable and thus not a 
credible threat. From the emerging-markets perspective, another reason for the attractiveness of 
signing a free-trade agreement with the EC is their competitive advantage. A free-trade agreement 
can level the playing field, for example for Brazil in relation to Mexico and Chile, both of which 
already  have  FTAs  with  the  EC.  Moreover,  there  is  an  insurance  against  trade  defense 
instruments as these are generally less used against trade partners. Furthermore, the EU could 
offer  additional  incentives  (and  therefore  show  generosity  to  build  more  political  trust)  by 
granting larger concessions or demanding fewer concessions than would be the case in a purely 
reciprocal give-and-take situation. However, even if the EU concessions were possible, what 
would the EU want to obtain in return? Market-access seems to be the evident answer. This is 
what trade negotiations are about. The Commission’s Directorate-General for trade would come 
under pressure if EU concessions were not used to enhance market-access for European exporters 
in growing and important emerging markets. 
However, there are also disadvantages to FTAs. There are transaction costs such as the 
danger of further proliferation of FTAs to the detriment of multilateral trade liberalization at the 
WTO level. In this sense, I would argue that the EU has responsibilities for the multilateral 
trading system and therefore should be defensive in bilateralism; in other words, the EU should 
only react when other countries move first with FTAs to EU export markets. That was the case 
with the U.S. and Japan after the suspension of the Doha round in July 2006 and the European 
Commission started negotiating FTAs with India, ASEAN, and South Korea. 
 
Trade Analysis of the EU vis-à-vis Brazil 
 
The EU is Brazil’s main trading partner, while Brazil represents the EU’s main trading partner in 
Latin America.
35 Brazil is an efficient agricultural producer with strong interest in EU agricultural 
liberalization. Furthermore, Brazil constitutes 1.5% of EU services trade with the world, with EU 
exports of services to Brazil totaling €4.4 billion and EU imports of services from Brazil in 2005 
                                                           
    
34 The Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP, is a formal system of exemption from the more general rules of 
the WTO. Specifically, it is a system of exemption from the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle that obligates WTO 
countries to treat the imports of all other WTO countries no worse than they treat the imports of their most favored 
trading partner. In essence, MFN requires WTO countries to treat imports coming from all other WTO countries 
equally, that is, by imposing equal tariffs on them, inter alia. See Wikipedia, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_System_of_Preferences (last visited May 1, 2008). 
    
35 EurActiv, “EU, Brazil join in strategic partnership,” 5 July 2007, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-brazil-join-strategic-partnership/article-165263 (last visited May 18, 2008).  11   
totaling €3.9 billion.
36 The 1992 EC-Brazil Cooperation Agreement
37 provides the institutional 
setting for the political ties between the EU and Brazil and a framework for cooperation in trade 
in services, among other fields. Since the establishment of the 1995 inter-regional Cooperation 
Agreement
38 between the EC and its Member States, on the European side, and Mercosur,
39 on 
the South American side, EU-Brazilian negotiations have mainly been carried out through this 
framework.
40 
  Since  2000,  the  EU  and  Mercosur  are  in  the  process  of  negotiating  a  bi-regional 
Association Agreement,
41 including a free trade area. This will be the backbone of future bilateral 
trade relations. Substantial progress in the trade chapter of the agreement allowed both parties to 
realistically envisage a conclusion of negotiations by the end of October 2004. However, on 20 
October 2004, at the occasion of a Mercosur-EU trade negotiators meeting at ministerial level in 
Lisbon, trade ministers concurred that the offers on the table did not reach the degree of ambition 
that  both  parties  expect  from  this  agreement  and  decided  to  give  negotiations  more  time. 
Following a number of technical contacts in 2005 to discuss the ways to re-engage the process, 
trade ministers met again on 2 September 2005 to discuss on a way forward.
42 In 2005, Brazil 
represented 80% of Mercosur’s GDP and is critical to Mercosur’s further integration.
43 In my 
opinion,  in  addition  to  the  EU  agricultural  liberalization  issue  mentioned  earlier,  this  intra-
Mercosur disparity is one of the reasons why the EU-Mercosur negotiations for the conclusion of 
a bi-regional free-trade agreement, which began in April 2000, do not seem to come to an end: on 
the South American end, there is a tremendous imbalance of power within Mercosur; Brazil is an 
enormous market of 190 million people, whereas Uruguay is of insignificant interest to Brazil, 
with a total population of 3,5 million people. This asymmetry makes Mercosur’s search for a 
common position vis-à-vis the EU very difficult. 
  In  July  2007,  the  EU-Brazil  Summit,  in  the  framework  of  a  Strategic  Partnership,
44 
reaffirmed both parties’ commitment to resolving the EU-Mercosur negotiations between the two 
blocs (which have been effectively stalled for more than two years),
45 the Doha round of trade 
negotiations,
46  as  well  as  initiating  a  dialogue  on  the  EU  and  Brazilian  shipping  market 
developments.
47  Despite  liberalisation  processes  throughout  the  1990’s,  Brazilian  goods  and 
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services markets still enjoy a relatively high level of protection through various barriers to trade 
of both a tariff and a non-tariff barrier nature, especially in transport and ports.
48 
So  what  is  Brazil’s  interest  in  EC  trade  policy?  Brazil’s  main  interest  is  the  EU’s 
agricultural liberalization, given that Brazil is considered a highly efficient agricultural producer 
that is expected to gain tremendously from the EU’s liberalization. If this will be the case after the 
conclusion  of  the  Doha  round,  it  will  certainly  be  so  even  more  from  a  potential  free-trade 
agreement.  Moreover,  Brazilian  exports  of  agricultural  products  (such  as  coffee,  cocoa,  and 
sugar) to the EU account for 41% of Brazilian exports,
49 and for 10% of EU imports. 
What can the EU offer Brazil? The EU could grant tariff preferences in agriculture and 
other goods where Brazil is competitive. For example, in biofuels and ethanol as environmental 
goods Brazil is by far the world’s most important producer of fuels made from plants, and it has 
the  greatest  potential  worldwide  for  affordable  biofuels.  The  country’s  traditional  sugar  cane 
cultures provide biomass for the production of ethanol, and soy beans are used to make fuel oils.
50 
However, granting tariff preferences to Brazil in agriculture may present difficulties. The reasons 
for these difficulties are: 1) the Doha round should have priority over regionalism or bilateralism; 
2) it is only reasonable to liberalize agricultural subsidies multilaterally in the context of the Doha 
round; and 3) agricultural tariff preferences to Brazil would strongly go against the interest of the 
poorer developing countries. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In my opinion, there is not much scope to use trade policy as a “carrot” in a policy area-centered 
approach in addition to what is currently being done. The European Commission’s Directorate-
General  for  external  trade  is  already  very  active.  Hence,  few  new  initiatives  seem  possible. 
Nevertheless, there is some, although limited, room for trade policy concessions with Brazil for 
the case of agriculture and the Doha round. The EU could offer additional incentives to Brazil by 
granting larger concessions or demanding fewer concessions than would be the case in a purely 
reciprocal give-and-take situation. However, even if the EU concessions were possible, what 
would the EU want to obtain in return? Market-access seems to be the evident answer. This is 
what trade negotiations are about. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for external 
trade would come under pressure if EU concessions were not used to enhance market-access for 
European exporters in growing and important emerging markets. 
What remains to be done? In my opinion, it is not about what, but how you negotiate: the 
European  Commission  should  negotiate  more  constructively,  without  patronizing  and  instead 
accepting Brazil as an equal player. Brazil is not yet an economic superpower; it is only starting 
to grow into a more powerful role. The EU should try to foster this positive development in a 
cooperative stance. 
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